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Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to identify the reasons for South Africa’s successful transition to 
democracy. There was a conjunction of favourable factors, which I have divided into the 
following categories: political; leadership; process; institutional; and social and structural. 
The factors are interlinked and overlap, and the categorisation is therefore partly a matter of 
convenience. 
Two preliminary comments are required. The first is to qualify the notion of ‘success’. South 
Africa’s transition can be regarded as successful on the grounds that the country has moved 
unequivocally from a system of authoritarianism, minority rule and repression to one of 
democracy, freedom and respect for human rights and the rule of law. Nevertheless, South 
Africa is wracked by a number of severe social and economic problems: unemployment is as 
high as 40%; acute poverty afflicts the majority of citizens; there are gross inequalities in 
income and wealth; there is a high level of violent crime; and there is a catastrophic HIV/Aids 
pandemic.  
The second introductory comment is to qualify the notion of ‘transition to democracy’. Such 
transitions depend not merely on the holding of a free and fair election but also, and more 
importantly, on the consolidation of democracy. This can take five years, ten years or longer. 
A country can get stuck in the position of being only partially democratic and in worst-case 
scenarios it can revert to authoritarian rule or civil war. 
 
Political factors, 1985-1990  
The relevant political factors relate chiefly to the balance of power in the late 1980s and the 
decision by the apartheid regime and the main liberation movement, the African National 
Congress (ANC), to embark on negotiations for a political settlement. 
In the academic literature on conflict resolution, William Zartman argues that protracted 
conflicts such as civil wars are “ripe for resolution” when there is a “mutually hurting 
stalemate”.1 In other words, it is not sufficient that the belligerents have reached a stalemate 
where none of them is able to win a decisive victory. It is also necessary that the position of 
all the belligerents is unfavourable, deteriorating inexorably, and unlikely to improve in the 
foreseeable future.  
                                                 
* Laurie Nathan is a Visiting Fellow with the Crisis States Programme at the London School of Economics, and a 
Senior Research Associate of the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, South Africa. He was Executive 
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1 See I. W. Zartman, ‘Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond’, in P. Stern & D. Druckman (eds), 
International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, Washington DC: National Academy Press, 2000, pp. 225-
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Viewed objectively, the apartheid regime and the ANC had reached a stalemate by the mid-
1980s. On the one hand, the government had full control of the state and the territory of the 
country; it had a powerful police service and defence force that were able to suppress the 
military activities of the ANC; and it was capable of preventing a seizure of power, the stated 
goal of the liberation movement. On the other hand, the ANC had massive popular support; it 
had a high level of organisation and mobilisation through trade unions, civic groups and 
political fronts; it enjoyed significant international support; and, through mass mobilisation, it 
was making the country increasingly ungovernable. 
The ending of the Cold War introduced the ‘mutually hurting’ dynamic. The Soviet Union 
was breaking up and would no longer provide arms and military training to the ANC. The 
United States began to withdraw from its involvement in wars in Southern Africa and could 
no longer be counted on to support Pretoria. Adding to the pain of the white community, the 
economy was in serious decline as a result of international sanctions and labour strikes. Of 
equal importance, the demise of the Cold War led to the attenuation of ideology as a source of 
tension between and within Southern African states. This gave rise to the  advent of multi-
party systems throughout the region, and in the early 1990s elections were held for the first 
time in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and Malawi.   
Notwithstanding these developments, a ‘mutual hurting stalemate’ is as much a subjective as 
an objective consideration. What matters is how political leaders assess the balance of power 
and the alternatives to negotiations. In the mid-1980s President P. W. Botha, who had risen to 
power in an alliance with the leadership of the  armed forces, believed that a combination of 
reform and repression would defuse the challenge of the ANC and preserve minority rule. In 
1989 he was replaced in a palace revolt by F. W. de Klerk, with whom the National 
Intelligence Service was aligned. In 1990 President  De Klerk unbanned the liberation 
movements, freed Nelson Mandela and other polit ical leaders from prison, and announced 
that he was willing to embark on multi-party negotiations. The ANC was prepared to 
participate in the negotiations and agreed to suspend its armed struggle.2  
 
Leadership factors, 1990-1994 
South Africa was blessed with mature political leadership in the course of its negotiations 
between 1990 and 1994. The leaders of almost every negotiating party, while determined to 
advance the interests of their respective constituencies, understood the importance of forging 
a settlement that served the national interest. They were also willing and able to achieve 
political reconciliation. The notion of ‘reconciliation’ is frequently used in a romantic and 
idealistic fashion, implying a level of personal friendship that is unnecessary and seldom 
attained. The kind of reconciliation that is needed to affect a transition from civil war to 
democracy requires a high level of political trust and a shift from relations of mortal enmity to 
relations of normal political contestation. 
Political leaders in South Africa were able to achieve the requisite trust. This is a vital issue 
because deep suspicion and mistrust inhibit negotiating parties from making compromises and 
accepting the assurances of their opponents. They fear that their enemy will renege on 
agreements and take advantage of any suspension or lessening of military mobilisation. In the 
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absence of mutual confidence, the parties remain locked in mutual recriminations and are 
unable to make progress towards resolving the substantive issues in dispute. 
Across the board, South African leaders were adept at negotiations. This issue is crucial 
because parties that are weak negotiators, whatever their strength otherwise, lack the skill to 
resolve deadlocks, are intransigent because of their lack of confidence, and tend to block 
progress through obstructionist tactics. They might even abandon the negotiations altogether. 
In the course of the Rwandese peace process in 1992-3, for example, the minority Tutsi 
parties consistently outmanoeuvred their Hutu opponents at the negotiating table. The 
emerging settlement was heavily weighted in favour of the minority, and this dynamic 
contributed to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.3  
Political leaders in South Africa understood that negotiated settlements, if they are to stand 
any chance of enduring, require all parties to compromise their positions and accommodate 
the needs and interests of their opponents. In particular, they understood that a sustainable 
settlement in South Africa would be one that simultaneously addressed the aspirations of the 
black majority and the fears of the white minority. Finally, the political leaders appreciated 
the necessity of selling the compromises to their respective parties and constituencies, and 
they succeeded in this regard. 
In contrast to the above, the post-apartheid state has suffered from a lack of managerial and 
technical competence in many areas of governance. The new state officials from the ANC had 
no prior experience in running complex government departments, and the officials from the 
previous regime were orientated towards serving the white minority rather than the country as 
a whole. Moreover, there has been a strong correlation between the competence of individual 
ministers and the performance of their departments.  
 
Process factors, 1990-1994 
The key process factors relate to the negotiations, which had a number of positive features. 
First, the negotiations were inclusive horizontally in the sense that all political parties, from 
the left to the far-right, were welcome and urged to participate. By contrast, two rebel 
movements were excluded from the Burundi peace process in 1998-9 and their exclusion has 
haunted the process and undermined stability ever since.4 Second, the negotiating process was 
inclusive vertically in the sense that the rank-and-file membership of political parties, and 
indeed all sectors of civil society, participated actively in the debates around the settlement 
and new constitution. This conferred legitimacy on both the process and the outcome of the 
talks. 
Third, the negotiations were not rushed. The process took nearly four years, allowing the 
parties to avoid vague solutions in a rush to meet deadlines. They were able to reach 
consensus on broad principles and then gradually eliminate the vagueness through more 
detailed negotiated positions. The duration of the talks also enabled an incremental building 
of confidence and trust, and a commensurate progression from relatively easy issues to those 
that were most difficult to resolve. 
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Fourth, South Africa’s peace agreement and political settlement were not imposed by external 
actors. Where extreme pressure is brought to bear on the belligerents in a civil war, they 
might agree to a ceasefire or settlement without a genuine commitment to it and then resume 
hostilities once the pressure eases. During the civil war in Liberia, for example, military 
enforcement action undertaken by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) led to as many as fourteen short-lived peace agreements between 1990 and 
1995.5 In the case of South Africa, the strong sense of local ownership has contributed greatly 
to the durability of the agreements reached.  
Fifth, the parties did not pursue a win- lose or zero-sum approach to the negotiations. The 
alternative notion of ‘win-win’ is simplistic and naïve, however. In reality, a sustainable 
settlement is one where all the parties have compromised their positions to some extent, but 
believe that they have won more than they have lost and are satisfied that they have not 
forsaken their core values and interests. As noted above, the South African negotiators made a 
concerted effort to accommodate diverse needs and interests. The net result was a grand 
balancing act in terms of race, ethnicity, class and political parties.6 
Sixth, the parties placed much emphasis on the constitution as a means of defining the powers 
and functions of the state; regulating the use of power; preventing abuse of power; and 
guaranteeing the rights of citizens and groups. Through various mechanisms, the Constitution 
of 1994 provides assurances and reassurances to groups in general, to minorities in particular, 
and to individuals. Group rights are secured principally through individual rights relating to 
language, religion, culture and freedom of association. 7 
 
Institutional factors, 1994- 
Three of the dynamics that characterised the negotiations have become institutionalised in the 
post-apartheid period, contributing significantly to stability and the consolidation of 
democracy. By ‘institutionalised’ I mean the development and acceptance of formal and 
informal principles, rules and norms for governing the behaviour of the state, political parties 
and civil society. 
The first institutionalised dynamic relates to the balancing act referred to above. For example, 
the electoral system of proportional representation affords political parties seats in Parliament 
according to their share of the popular vote. Many minority parties would have no seats in a 
winner-takes-all constituency based system. The balancing act was also evident in the 
Government of National Unity established after the first democratic election in 1994, an 
arrangement that gave ministerial posts to opposition parties. In terms of the negotiated 
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Mutshutshu, The African National Congress and the Negotiated Settlement in South Africa, 
Johannesburg/Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik, 1998; I. Sarakinsky, ‘The politics behind South Africa’s negotiated 
settlement’, Journal for Contemporary History, 20:2 (1995); and A. Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country: The 
Inside Story of South Africa’s Negotiated Revolution, London: Heinemann, 1995. 
7 See P. Andrews & S. Ellman (eds), The South African Constitutions: Perspectives in South Africa’s Basic Law, 
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settlement, President Mbeki is no longer obliged to continue this arrangement ten years later, 
but he has chosen to appoint opposition politicians to his cabinet. 
The balancing act was institutionalised, too, in the defence sector. This is a crucial area since 
the military can thwart transitions to democracy and undermine civilian rule in new 
democracies. In South Africa the apartheid military and the armed wings of the liberation 
movements were formally integrated into the new South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF), ensuring its legitimacy and lowering the risk that it might be used for partisan 
political ends. The balancing act in the interests of stability was also apparent in the following 
appointments in 1994: the new Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence were members of 
the ANC; the Chief of the SANDF was the former head of the apartheid army; the Secretary 
for Defence was the former chief-of-staff of the apartheid army; and the chairperson of the 
parliamentary committee on defence was a member of the ANC.8 
The second dynamic to have become institutionalised can be termed constitutionalism. The 
state, political parties and civil society have demonstrated deep respect for the rule of law, 
constitutional principles and the Bill of Rights. The Constitutional Court, which is 
independent of the Executive and filled by judges of high calibre, has on several occasions 
overruled Executive decisions as well as legislation approved by Parliament on the grounds of 
inconsistency with constitutional principles or rights. The Court has generally interpreted 
rights and resolved disputes in the interests of the poor and is gradually developing a body of 
progressive law. It is striking that social movements engaged in civil disobedience over a 
specific government policy have emphasised their acceptance of the legitimacy of the state. 
Third, pacific forms of conflict management have become institutionalised. The processes of 
dialogue and negotiations that were employed in the 1990-1994 period are now used routinely 
at national, provincial and local levels. Parliament and national ministers have frequently 
convened public conferences to debate conflictual issues. Civil disobedience has taken place 
largely without resort to violence on the part of the protesters and the state. There is still much 
intolerance, bureaucratic insensitivity, violent crime, racism and racial tension, but it is fair to 
say that pacific conflict resolution has become part of the political culture of South African 
society. 
 
Social and structural factors  
I have linked these categories to make the point that South Africa was not a ‘failed state’ at 
the time of its transition. By the standards of the developing world, it had a relatively strong 
state, political sector, economy and civil society. This has greatly facilitated reconstruction 
and the consolidation of democracy. By contrast, there are many African countries where, as a 
result of civil war, the state crumbled or was smashed; political control is exercised by local 
warlords; civil society is extremely weak; and economic activity is largely informal and 
characterised by corruption and plunder. The establishment and consolidation of democracy 
in these circumstances is very difficult. 
Nor has South Africa experienced the legacy of fear, hatred and polarisation that afflicts many 
countries emerging from civil war. The black majority has shown surprisingly little desire to 
                                                 
8 See L. Nathan, ‘Civil-Military Relations in the New South Africa’, in W. Gutteridge (ed.), South Africa's 
Defence and Security into the 21st Century, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996, pp. 87-109; and L. Nathan, ‘The 1996 
Defence White Paper: An Agenda for State Demilitarisation’, in J. Cock & P. McKenzie (eds), From Defence to 
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punish apartheid villains and appropriate the wealth and property of the white community. On 
the side of white right-wing groups, there is a surprisingly low level of hate speech and 
extreme racism; most of these groups tend to emphasise the promotion and protection of the 
Afrikaans language and culture. In general, despite the on-going racism, racial tension and 
acute socio-economic inequity, there is a strong sense of a united country whose Constitution 
and institutions are legitimate. 
This sense of national unity and reconciliation after three centuries of oppression and division 
is hard to explain. It is probably attributable to African culture, the reconciliatory stance 
adopted by political leaders, the inclusive nature of the negotiations, and the progressive 
content of the Constitution. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is also relevant in this 
regard. Although the Commission did not achieve justice and advance social and community 
reconciliation, it had a symbolic and cathartic effect by exposing the worst excesses of 
apartheid and giving the survivors a platform to tell their stories.9 
 
Conclusion 
Revolutions always seem impossible before they happen and inevitable afterwards. The same 
is true of negotiated settlements to end civil wars. South Africans, now accustomed to 
constitutional rule, tend to regard their settlement as pre-ordained but this was certainly not 
the case. The negotiations were repeatedly wracked by crises of various kinds. Shortly before 
the first democratic election in 1994, the level of violence was so high and conservative 
parties were so opposed to the settlement that free and fair elections seemed improbable. At 
that time the country appeared to be at the edge of an abyss.  
The success of the transition was due to a range of objective factors, but it was also a product 
of subjective factors relating to the behaviour of political parties and their leaders. In general, 
the resolution of conflict is unimaginable when thousands of people have been killed, the 
enemy is perceived as less than human and the conflict is viewed in zero-sum terms. The 
solution may be obvious in theory but seems impossible to achieve in practice. As with Israel-
Palestine and other intractable conflicts, there is a failure of political imagination that has to 
be overcome by courageous and creative leaders. 
 
 
                                                 
9 See D. Posel & G. Simpson (eds), Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2002; and Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Cape Town: Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 1998. 
 7
References 
Adam, H. and Moodley, K., The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-
Apartheid South Africa, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1993 
Adelman, H. and Suhrke, A., The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons 
from the Rwanda Experience. Study 2: Early Warning and Conflict Management, London: 
Overseas Development Institute and Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation 
of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996 
Andrews, P. and Ellman, S. (eds), The South African Constitutions: Perspectives in South 
Africa’s Basic Law, Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Press, 2001 
Ebrahim, H., Soul of a Nation: Constitution-Making in South Africa, Oxford University Press: 
Cape Town, 1998 
Friedman, S. and Atkinson, D. (eds), The Small Miracle: South Africa’s Negotiated 
Settlement. South African Review 7, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994 
Haysom, N., ‘Negotiating the Political Settlement in South Africa: Are There Lessons for 
Other Countries?’ Track Two, 11:3 (May 2002) 
Moss, G. and Obery, I. (eds), From Red Friday to CODESA. South African Review 6, 
Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992 
Mthembu-Salter, G., ‘Mediation and Genocide in Rwanda’, Track Two, 11:5/6 (October 
2002), pp. 5-20 
Mthembu-Salter, G., ‘Burundi’s Peace Agreement without Peace’, Track Two, Vol. 11:5/6 
(October 2002), pp. 21-35 
Mutshutshu, R., The African National Congress and the Negotiated Settlement in South 
Africa. Johannesburg/Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik, 1998 
Nathan, L., ‘Civil-Military Relations in the New South Africa’, in W. Gutteridge (ed.), South 
Africa's Defence and Security into the 21st Century, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996, pp. 87-109 
Nathan, L., ‘The 1996 Defence White Paper: An Agenda for State Demilitarisation’, in J. 
Cock and P. McKenzie (eds), From Defence to Development: Redirecting Military Resources 
in South Africa, Cape Town: David Philip, 1998, pp. 41-59 
Nathan, L., ‘When Push Comes to Shove: The Failure of International Mediation in African 
Civil Wars’, Track Two, 8:2 (November 1999) 
Posel, D. and Simpson, G. (eds), Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2002 
Sarakinsky, I., ‘The politics behind South Africa’s negotiated settlement’, Journal for 
Contemporary History, 20:2 (1995) 
Sparks, A., Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Negotiated 
Revolution, London: Heinemann, 1995 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa 
Report, Cape Town: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998 
Zartman, I. W., ‘Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond’, in P. Stern & D. Druckman 
(eds), International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, Washington DC: National 
Academy Press, 2000, pp. 225-250 
 8
Discussion Papers in Series 
 
DP1 James Putzel, ‘The Politics of ‘Participation’: Civil Society, the State and Development Assistance’ 
(January 2004) 
DP2 James Putzel, ‘The ‘new’ imperialism and possibilities of co-existence’ (January 2004) 
DP3 Jean-Paul Faguet, ‘Democracy in the Desert: Civil Society, Nation Building and Empire’ (January 
2004) 
DP4 Manoj Srivastava, ‘Moving Beyond “Institutions Matter”: Some Reflections on how the “Rules of the 
Game” Evolve and Change’ (March 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These can be downloaded from the Crisis States website (www.crisisstates.com), where an up-to-date list of all 
our publications and events can be found. 
 
